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INTRODUCTION 
In the last several years there has been increasing public discus-
sion within Canada over the future of the Canadian forces. One aspect 
of particular concern has been the state of Maritime Command (MAR-
COM). The May 1983 report by the Senate's Subcommittee on Na-
tional Defence of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,1 coupled 
with the government's decision to proceed with the construction of 
six new frigates and the renovation of existing destroyers, has served 
to highlight serious deficiencies in Canada's current maritime posture. 
The program announced by the government will not entirely correct 
those deficiencies and, as the Senate Committee report argues, much 
more will have to be done. 
The overall view to be considered by this article is that, in terms 
of the military tasks facing MARCOM and likely circumstances under 
which Canada will have to apply force at sea, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) commitments must be regarded as the domi-
nant determinant in decisions regarding Canada's future maritime 
posture. This view does not deny Canada's need to provide for its 
own seaward defenses. It does, however, hold that on a list of maritime 
defense priorities, Canada's commitment to collective security through 
NATO, and thus its support for the Alliance's maritime strategies, 
should come first. 
This proposition is based upon two fundamental considerations. 
First, NATO is a maritime alliance and the maintenance of adequate 
maritime forces is an essential element in the Alliance's overall de-
terrent posture, especially with regard to the strategy of flexible re-
sponse. Second, given the importance of maritime forces to NATO, 
Canada's maritime forces represent reasonable expenditures of scarce 
resources because they have been, and can still be, fully integrated 
with the collective maritime forces of its allies. Moreover, with an anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) emphasis especially suited to convoy escort, 
Canada's maritime forces have the potential to make a specialized, 
yet significant and necessary, contribution to collective maritime se-
curity. A continuation and expansion of this emphasis would be as 
strategically sensible for Canada as it would be for NATO as a whole. 
SEAPOWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: NATO AS A MARITIME 
ALLIANCE 
At present there is a debate within the foreign affairs literature 
in the United States over the broad course of the American strategic 
posture. There are those who call for at least a partial rejection of 
the "continental/coalition" strategy which places NATO at the fore-
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front of U.S. strategic concerns and an inclination toward a more 
"maritime" global strategy which seeks to strengthen the ability of the 
United States to defend its interests outside of the area covered by 
the North Atlantic Treaty. The latter strategy stresses the importance 
of the mobile striking power afforded by the U.S. Navy, in particular 
its large nuclear carriers which can go anywhere American power may 
be needed.2 
The debate is a significant one not only for the United States but, 
as has been recognized, for the entire NATO alliance including Can-
ada. It is important because it raises basic questions about the ability 
and necessity of the United States to meet its commitments in Europe 
while at the same time maintaining the wherewithal to defend Amer-
ica's extra-European interests. However, it is not very useful to cast 
it in terms of "maritime strategy" vs. "coalition/continental strategy" 
inasmuch as NATO itself is a maritime alliance. 
NATO is a maritime alliance not simply because nearly all its 
members have coastlines and are dependent to varying degrees upon 
ship-borne commerce. This situation only makes alliance members 
more vulnerable to threats at sea. NATO is a maritime alliance by 
reason of the nature of the overall strategic threat and the means 
taken collectively through the Alliance to counter that threat. As John 
Clark observed in 1967, "If merchant shipping were no longer to ply 
the sea lanes, a naval presence would still be essential for the free 
world."3* 
The maritime character of the NATO alliance results from the 
very fact that it is a coalition of states whose primary purpose is to 
maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of its 
members on the European continent. In pursuit of this objective, the 
allied nations have maintained and earmarked for collective use a vast 
array of nuclear and conventional forces. The Alliance has also de-
veloped an elaborate military and civilian infrastructure to prepare 
for and, if necessary, to direct the prosecution of a war against the 
forces of the Warsaw Pact nations. It is upon this aggregation of forces 
and the continuing preparations made for their wartime employment 
that deterrence is based. 
Integral to the combined military forces of NATO are its collec-
tive maritime forces. As with other aspects of the aggregated allied 
forces, maritime forces include those capable of nuclear and conven-
tional warfare.** NATO has maintained maritime forces because of 
the importance of the seas to its overall deterrent posture, particularly 
as that posture relates to the land/air defense of its continental mem-
bers. At the strategic nuclear level, the Alliance has come to rely upon 
the sea-based nuclear strike capabilities of the American submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) some of which are specifically ded-
icated to NATO. As well, since 1954 American carrier-based aircraft, 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, have been named to NATO 
tasks and comprise part of the Alliance's available theatre/tactical nu-
clear capabilities. The sea-based nuclear strike capabilities of the French 
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and British also, although not as directly, constitute part of NATO's 
aggregated maritime forces. 
In the nuclear age it is not surprising that NATO availed itself 
of the deterrent value afforded by forces capable of projecting atomic 
weapons ashore, although by far the greatest number of allied mar-
itime forces are devoted to the more traditional tasks of protecting 
die sea lines of communication (SLOC). Included here are diose forces, 
whether based on land or sea, capable of seeking out and destroying 
submarines and aircraft which could threaten the movement, by sea, 
of military reinforcements and economic cargo. Also included are 
minesweeping forces and others utilized for harbour protection, and 
there are ground forces, such as those of the German Army, dedicated 
to securing the coastal areas of the Baltic exits. Further, merchant 
shipping capacity constitutes part of the overall allied maritime pos-
ture because it could be essential for the movement of American 
reinforcements to Europe. Over the years, particularly in the last 
several years, NATO has sought to enhance its ability to organize 
collectively and control merchant shipping in the event of war. 
Two of the three major NATO commands (MMCs)—Supreme 
Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander-in-Chief 
Channel (CINCHAN)—were established to provide peacetime prep-
aration and wartime direction of allied maritime forces. Subordinate 
to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) are several com-
mands whose function it is to direct allied maritime forces in the 
Mediterranean and Baltic Seas (see Appendix A). 
Taken together, the collective maritime forces of the allies both 
conventional and nuclear, under the direction of allied commanders, 
will seek to secure and exploit the sea for conveyance and for the 
projection of military forces ashore. They will also attempt to deny 
to the Warsaw Pact the ability to secure and exploit the seas by, for 
example, preventing such incidents as an amphibious assault by the 
Pact against Denmark or Norway. The ultimate objective of both 
conveyance and projection, and the denial of these usages, is to in-
fluence the situation ashore. This capability applies to peacetime de-
terrence as well as wartime defense. To the extent that the Alliance 
maintains a sea-based nuclear projection capability, or the ability to 
sealift reinforcements in a conventional conflict, the balance of power 
in Europe is strengthened in the Alliance's favor. The threat posed 
by the large Warsaw Pact conventional forces is partially negated. 
This support of the allied land/air posture has been the chief 
function of the combined maritime forces of NATO since 1949. The 
existence of these forces and the plans and command structures for-
mulated for their use have made NATO one of the great maritime 
alliances in history. Given the centrality of the European balance to 
the entire global strategic situation, this maritime alliance constitutes 
one of the pre-eminent examples of seapower in the nuclear age. 
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MARITIME FORCES AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 
Until the early seventies, NATO maritime forces faced no major 
threat to their ability to secure the sea for conveyance and projection. 
Except in some of the immediate coastal waters, that is, those within 
range of Soviet land-based aviation and short-range submarines, the 
Alliance was almost assured of being able quickly to make use of the 
seas to support forces ashore. NATO's relatively favourable maritime 
position, however, coincided with an overall strategy—that of massive 
retaliation—which did not demand an extensive ability to secure the 
seas, particularly for conveyance. To be sure, the Alliance had planned 
from the outset for some sort of sealift reinforcement and, thus, 
protection of the SLOC and harbours could not be ignored. Yet, the 
relative importance of conventional maritime forces was not consid-
ered crucial. Carriers and ballistic missile submarines needed only to 
secure their immediate waters in order to perform their protection 
function. During these years NATO by no means completely disre-
garded its conventional maritime forces (and even deployed nuclear 
ASW weapons), but it can be said that it had a level of maritime 
superiority over and above what was required for a strategy of massive 
retaliation based upon overwhelming nuclear superiority. 
With the shifting nuclear balance, and the consequent emphasis 
upon graduated and flexible response based on a greater measure of 
conventional deterrence, NATO's need to exploit the strategic value 
of the seas increased markedly. The demands upon its collective mar-
itime forces in terms of the number and kinds of ships and weapons 
dedicated to securing control of the seas expanded. If conventional 
war was to be fought for more than several weeks, reinforcement and 
resupply would have to be brought across the Atlantic. Troops could 
be airlifted to prepositioned equipment, but, as the 1981 British state-
ment on defense noted: "The conventional defence of Central Europe 
depends crucially on transatlantic reinforcement and resupply. De-
spite the major improvements now planned in airlift and prestocking, 
the bulk of equipment and resupply would have to come by sea."4 
Along the northern and southern flanks, maritime forces would be 
immediately necessary to bolster generally weaker allied forces with 
reinforcements and additional airpower. Most significantly, the Alli-
ance's increased need to exploit the strategic value of the seas grew 
at the same time that the Soviet Union's maritime forces were dra-
matically increasing their capabilities. 
In the view of most analysts, the Soviet Navy has not been de-
veloped primarily for sea lane interdiction. In the early post-World 
War II era, the Soviets were primarily concerned with countering 
what they perceived as an amphibious and carrier-based threat from 
the United States. Thus, great emphasis was placed on submarines 
and land-based naval aviation. With the introduction by the United 
States of SSBNs, the threat to Soviet territory increased while the 
ability of the Soviet Navy to counter it decreased given the long ranges 
of the American Polaris SLBMs. As the USSR itself acquired a long-
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range SLBM capability, the Soviet Navy began to give more attention 
to the protection of its sea-based nuclear strike capability. More re-
cently, the Soviets have also used their maritime forces for Third 
World presence and intervention. 
In the event of rising NATO/Warsaw Pact tensions, the Soviets 
will most likely pull back the bulk of their fleets to more secure waters 
near the Eurasian land mass, adopting a defensive position. It is, 
however, the defensive tasks of the USSR's non-strategic maritime 
forces which, ironically, pose the greatest threat to NATO and its 
flexible response strategy. This threat includes sea lane interdiction. 
With their enhanced submarine and naval aviation capabilities, the 
Soviets will attempt to push out their defensive perimeter well into 
the Norwegian, Baltic and Eastern Mediterranean Seas. In the north, 
concern over defending the SSBN fleet located in the Barents Sea as 
well as the important military installations on or near the Kola Pen-
insula, could prompt the USSR to seize parts of northern Norway. 
A forward defense strategy on the part of the Soviets would, 
therefore, involve challenging NATO for control of sea areas vital to 
the Alliance. It would also put the Soviets in a better position to strike 
at allied SLOC, as part of a general campaign directed towards weak-
ening the NATO posture on the ground in Europe. Although the 
Soviet Navy is not "optimized" for such a campaign, "its forces have 
significant capabilities to pursue such a strategy." "Furthermore," notes 
the United States Congressional Budget Office, "deployments appro-
priate to SSBN protection operations are also appropriate for sea lane 
attacks. It therefore appears prudent for Western forces to plan to 
defend the sea lanes against a Soviet Navy whose ability to attack those 
sea lanes is growing."5 
For NATO, defense of the sea lanes could take a number of 
forms depending upon the disposition of Soviet maritime and other 
forces and the risks the alliance is willing to run. One option, currently 
being debated in the United States, is an offensive strategy. Utilizing 
American carriers and attack submarines, NATO would move against 
Soviet bases, particularly naval aviation bases, in an effort to contain 
Soviet anti-SLOC forces as far as possible from allied lines of com-
munication. The approach has two major drawbacks. First, given the 
strength of defending Soviet forces, including land-based air armed 
with air-to-surface missiles, carriers moving close to the USSR would 
be subjected to a concentrated air, surface and sub-surface attack. 
Considerable doubt has been cast on the ability of such a carrier force 
to survive in this environment.6 Second, NATO sea-based attacks upon 
Soviet territory could threaten the USSR's SSBN forces and therefore 
run the risk of "crossing the 'firebreak' between conventional and 
nuclear war."7 
This is not to say that the Alliance has ruled out sending carriers 
into the Norwegian Sea. It may be compelled to do so in order to 
counter Soviet forces moving into Norway. Moreover, while the car-
riers will be vulnerable, most naval analysts agree that the more car-
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riers present, the better the chances of individual ships surviving 
because of the added protection afforded by increased numbers of 
aircrafts and protecting escorts.8 
If the Soviets do not make a determined effort to break out 
beyond the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap and adopt an 
extremely defensive posture, NATO might adopt a more defensive 
approach to sea lane protection. ASW and anti-air barriers could be 
established at or near the gap and convoys would afford close surface, 
air and sub-surface protection as they moved across the Atlantic be-
hind the barriers. Convoys could be routed further south, turning 
northward somewhere below Gibraltar. 
NATO, therefore, could employ a number of approaches to SLOC 
protection and it seems fair to assume that some combination of of-
fensive and defensive tactical approaches will be employed. For this 
reason, the Alliance has sought, within the constraints imposed on 
national military expenditures, to maintain a capability to employ as 
wide a range of approaches as possible. Yet, uncertainties remain. 
Where, if at all, will NATO begin a sealift? Will existing forces in 
Europe and those air-lifted in be able to hold long enough to await 
the outcome of a battle for control of the vital sea lanes? Even if 
NATO prevails at sea, will it be too little too late? Finally, the most 
difficult question, how long can a war remain conventional? 
All these uncertainties regarding the role of maritime forces have 
arisen in large part because of the intractable, although seemingly 
unavoidable, ambiguities of the flexible response strategy itself. The 
improvement of the USSR's maritime capabilities only compounded 
the uncertainties and problems surrounding flexible response. For in 
a real sense NATO had adopted an overall approach to deterrence 
and defense which was more suited to the measure of maritime su-
periority it had enjoyed in the early Cold War days. 
The Alliance has not, however, been standing still with regard to 
its maritime posture. At the time the flexible response strategy was 
adopted in 1967, NATO naval officers began offering warnings con-
cerning the consequences of such a strategy for allied maritime forces. 
In 1968, at the request of then Secretary General Brosio, the Supreme 
Allied Commander Atlantic (S ACL ANT), conducted the first com-
prehensive review of relative NATO and Warsaw Pact maritime forces. 
The Brosio Study warned that by the end of the 1970s, the Alliance 
would be in serious trouble at sea.9 
To varying degrees, the warning contained in the Brosio Study 
prompted efforts to improve NATO's maritime posture. Other steps, 
such as the development of a Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STAN-
AVFORLANT) and Standing Naval Force Channel (STANFOR-
ÇHAN), plus the creation of an on-call force in the Mediterranean, 
were also taken. In the last few years NATO's major military com-
mands— SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCHAN—developed a re-
vised "concept of maritime operations." According to recently retired 
SACLANT Admiral Harry Train (USN) the concept "identifies NATO 
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maritime interests and assesses the threats to these interests, considers 
the type of confrontation that can be expected and the associated 
allied priorities." It establishes the principles to be used by allied forces 
and outlines the likely campaigns to be waged as well as the forces 
needed. In its operations, NATO's maritime forces will stress "con-
tainment, defense in depth and keeping the initiative."10 
Throughout the 1970s, the Alliance also improved procedures 
for the timely acquisition of non-U.S. merchant ships to support an 
American reinforcement sealift. For the first time, the U.S. military 
has a list of vessels which were "pre-allocated" to support a major 
sealift operation. These measures were part of a general effort to 
enhance NATO's ability to mobilize and reinforce during a pre-hos-
tilities period of tension. In December 1982, the Defense Planning 
Committee approved an Alliance-wide plan for the crisis reinforce-
ment of Europe with forces from North America, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom. The plan calls for the movement of hundreds of 
combat aircraft, hundreds of thousands of men and millions of tons 
of equipment, ammunition and resupply to Europe "within a period 
of several weeks." Most of the personnel will move by air, some to 
prepositioned equipment, but nearly all cargo would be brought in 
by sea.11 With this plan, NATO would hope to deter war by dem-
onstrating its willingness and capacity to defend itself. Should war 
break out, however, this crisis reinforcement would offer some hope 
of sustained conventional resistance and a hedge against the need to 
resort to nuclear weapons. 
It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that as NATO has become more 
and more of a maritime alliance, increasingly dependent upon its 
maritime forces to support its position on land and in the air in 
Europe, some analysts in the United States should characterize a turn-
ing away from NATO as a "maritime strategy." The fact is, an Amer-
ican global marit ime posture which "presumes a prolonged 
conventional war in the Atlantic/Mediterranean region, generates re-
quirements for large forces."12 
At this time, there is no official indication that the United States 
intends to weaken its commitments to NATO and to the strategy of 
flexible response. Yet, in the coming years, the U.S. Navy will be hard 
pressed to meet its Alliance obligations as well as demands likely to 
be placed upon it outside the NATO arena. In the past, the U.S. has 
looked to its allies to provide conventional maritime forces to sup-
plement those of the U.S. Such contributions are likely to become 
even more important in the future. 
CANADA AND NATO'S MARITIME STRATEGY 
Space does not allow for the provision of a detailed history of 
the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and MARCOM. It is, however, im-
portant to point out the extent to which perceptions of a military 
threat in Europe (rather than specific Canadian maritime needs such 
as sovereignty protection and protection of Canadian seaborne trade) 
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were responsible for the development of the postwar maritime pos-
ture—a posture which came to stress ASW capabilities almost exclu-
sively. 
Planning for the postwar RCN had begun during the war itself. 
During that conflict, the Navy had built a largely escort fleet to meet 
the needs of the trans-Atlantic convoys. For the postwar era the RCN 
looked to the creation of a more balanced conventional fleet including 
two carriers, four cruisers and two destroyer flotillas as well as various 
coastal patrol vessels.13 Throughout the fifties and early sixties the 
RCN had attempted to maintain a balanced fleet which included the 
aircraft carrier Bonaventure, which carried Banshee fighter aircraft. 
Within NATO, Canada had early on pledged itself to making a 
specialized commitment to the Alliance's ASW forces in the Atlantic. 
At the first meeting of the North Atlantic Regional Planning Group 
in October 1949, Canada was made a member of the planning sub-
group for the Atlantic lines of communication. This group was to 
deal specifically with the "organization, control and protection of con-
voys."14 With the creation of SACLANT in 1952, Canada also assumed 
responsibility for the Canadian Atlantic Sub-area (CANLANT). Sub-
ordinate to the Commander, Western Atlantic (usually SACLANT 
himself), CANLANT encompassed the waters of Canada's eastern 
shore roughly east to Greenland and south to the Gulf of Maine. Until 
unification in 1968, it was jointly under the command of an RCN 
Admiral and a senior Royal Canadian Air Force officer, the latter 
having responsibility for land-based maritime air.*** 
Canada's commitment to the NATO maritime Alliance, in par-
ticular its pledge to provide ASW ships for convoy escort, made sense 
not only in regard to NATO but in terms of Canada's overall com-
mitment to the defense of Europe. Even during the days of "massive 
retaliation," Canada along with its allies, especially the United States, 
had sought to maintain a conventional capability in Europe and to 
reinforce it if necessary through sealift. As Brian Cuthbertson has put 
it, "Once the Canadian government committed forces to Europe and 
made Europe a strategic frontier of Canadian defence, then main-
tenance of secure sea communications across the Atlantic was a sine 
qua non."15 
The commitment to NATO and especially the emphasis upon 
ASW and convoy escort were to shape the RCN. While the maritime 
building program of the early 1950s rearmament contained general 
purpose forces, as cutbacks were made in the RCN over the years, 
the NATO ASW role came to dominate remaining vessels. Even the 
lone carrier replaced its fighter aircraft with the anti-submarine Tracker. 
As one 1968 official RCN history put it: ". . . in the ensuing years, 
non-anti-submarine units such as cruisers, fighter aircraft and mi-
nesweepers have been phased out so that the R.C.N, could concentrate 
on becoming highly specialized in the techniques of its chosen field."16 
Eventually, even the carrier was scrapped and the RCN (now Maritime 
Command) concentrated on surface and land-based air ASW. 
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While the late 1960s saw Canada left with a small, almost exclu-
sively ASW force still suited for the NATO role, that role itself was 
coming into question as M ARCOM entered a period of general decline 
from which it has yet to fully emerge. 
There are many reasons for the decline of Canada's maritime 
forces beginning in the late 1960s: Prime Minister Trudeau's views 
on the need to maintain standing forces, a desire to reorient all the 
armed forces toward more national tasks, such as non-military sov-
ereignty protection, and budgetary restrictions arising from the ever-
high costs of maintaining modern maritime forces. Underlying, and 
perhaps rationalizing these other reasons, appears to have been a 
growing perception that the tasks to which Canada's maritime forces 
were dedicated—ASW in support of securing allied SLOC—had be-
come anachronistic in the missile age, in particular given the link 
between ASW and conventional defense. In 1970, the Maritime Sub-
committee of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Ex-
ternal Affairs and National Defence concluded that ". . . no need for 
convoy protection can be envisioned in any likely military eventual-
ity."17 
This was a surprising statement in view of the fact that Canada 
had three years earlier endorsed the flexible response strategy with 
its wide-ranging implications for allied maritime strategy. As noted, 
by the early seventies, NATO had begun to look closely at its maritime 
posture and the problems posed by the new overall allied strategy and 
the growing capability of Soviet maritime forces which threatened to 
undermine it. It seems reasonable, therefore, that Canada, having 
decided to remain a contributor to the NATO maritime alliance was, 
by the mid-seventies, planning to improve its maritime forces, in par-
ticular to enhance and modernize its ASW capabilities through the 
purchase of new LPRAs and surface vessels. 
Canada did acquire the CP-140 Aurora and has now decided to 
go forward with the new frigate program of six ships and perhaps a 
follow-up of six more. As the Senate Subcommittee so convincingly 
argues, this may be too little too late, "MARCOM, which is responsible 
for the country's seaward defences, cannot meet its commitments to 
the protection of Canadian sovereignty, to the defence of North 
America—much less to NATO."18 
In response to this gap between commitments and capabilities, 
the Subcommittee has proposed a dramatic program for the creation 
of "balanced fleet" by 1996, summarized in Table A taken from the 
report. 
As the Subcommittee rightly maintains, its proposed program 
would greatly expand Canada's ability to contribute to the NATO 
maritime alliance. The continuing relevance of these NATO contri-
butions will be discussed below. At this juncture, it is necessary to 
consider the justification of these numbers and kinds of forces in terms 
of Canada's own specific maritime requirements as well as the Sub-
committee view that Canada should have a significant capability to 
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respond alone to all maritime threats save a nuclear missile attack. 
When discussing the tasks and needs of M ARCOM in responding 
to maritime direats, the Subcommittee makes it clear that it is referring 
to military threats against which the real or apprehended use of force 
will be directed. Thus, its proposals for the balanced fleet are based 
upon specific wartime tasks. Support for civilian authority or other 
"ancillary missions" can be performed by MARCOM, but these are 
non-military, secondary tasks. When considering military missions to 
protect Canadian sovereignty, the Subcommittee makes it evident that 
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are the only group of 
states which constitute a military threat to Canada. It is only against 
the maritime forces of these countries that Canada would be at all 
likely to apply military force at sea. There is no possibility that such 
a force would be used against allies, even if their ships violated Ca-
nadian sovereignty.19 
What are the maritime threats posed by the Warsaw Pact against 
Canada? According to the Subcommittee they include: attacks from 
ballistic missile nuclear submarines, attack from missiles and aircraft 
launched from ships (including cruise missiles), large and small am-
phibious landings against coastal areas of outlying installations, in-
terruptions of shipping, and the mining of harbours and choke points. 
A weakened Canadian maritime force would well tempt Warsaw Pact 
forces into believing that they could, under varying circumstances, 
obtain a "free ride" in Canadian sovereign waters.20 
The balanced fleet proposed by the Senate Subcommittee would 
dramatically improve Canada's current capability to contribute to North 
American and allied collective security at sea. It would afford Canada 
the means not only to secure its own waters, but to provide surveillance 
and, if necessary, to apply directly military force within the CAN-
LANT area of SACLANT. The addition of heretofore non-existent 
modern minesweepers and fast patrol boats could ensure a significant 
capability to counter Soviet attempts to threaten harbour facilities and 
other coastal sea areas from which reinforcement shipping would 
depart. Arming the CF-18 with anti-shipping missiles could likewise 
improve Canada's coastal defense. The overall numerical increases 
proposed by the Subcommittee would further allow Canada to provide 
more forces for the Pacific while increasing its ability to contribute to 
the NATO maritime alliance. 
The total cost of the Subcommittee's program, over and above 
existing proposals (which presumes a follow-on of an additional six 
new frigates with helicopters to the six already decided upon) would 
be $5.9 billion (1983 constant dollars) by 1996. Of this, $3.315 billion 
would be spent on the acquisition of seventeen submarines.21 While 
the Subcommittee believes this amount can be managed, the current 
government in Ottawa has indicated that the country could not afford 
it. In addition to the $3.85 billion to be spent on the new frigates (for 
only the first six), Canada has begun a nearly $400 million Destroyer 
Life Extension Programme (DELEX) to keep older ships operational 
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until the new frigates are ready. There are also plans for the ex-
penditure of $650 million to modernize and update the four tribal-
class destroyers, as well as the funding of new icebreakers.22 
Facing a federal deficit approaching $30 billion, it does not seem 
likely that the present government or a new Conservative government, 
will implement the program outlined by the Senate Subcommittee, 
worthy as it might be. Thus, consideration should be given to a more 
modest program—one that will allow Canada to meet its own specific 
maritime needs, yet one that more importantly will also allow MAR-
COM to make an effective contribution to the NATO maritime pos-
ture. 
NATO considerations should be decisive in selection of forces 
for MARCOM because it is in the NATO context that Canada's mar-
itime forces would be most likely to perform their military tasks. 
Furthermore, it is only in the NATO context that Canada could make 
an effective and significant contribution to collective maritime secu-
rity. 
The gravest sea-based threat to Canada would come from nuclear 
attacks by either SLBMs or cruise missiles. Against such attacks, there 
TABLE A 





Operational Support Ships 
Diving Support Ship 
Minehunters 
Minesweepers 
Fast Patrol boats 
LRPAs 
Coastal Patrol Aircraft 
ASW helicopters 
Attack aircraft 

















































* In both models this number would stabilize at 16 in 1997/98 
** Harpoon-equipped CF-18s to be drawn from Tactical Air Group and Air Defence 
Group 
(Source: Canada, Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
National Defence, Report, Canada's Maritime Defence (Ottawa, Minister of Supply and 
Services, 1983), p. 57.) 
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would be little that Canada's maritime forces could do. A situation in 
which Canada found itself the object of nuclear attack would be one 
in which the U.S. and USSR were already engaged in^  a strategic 
nuclear war—a war in which most allied maritime forces would be of 
little use. 
Maritime forces would be most relevant in a conventional or 
severely limited nuclear war which emerged out of a period of rising 
East/West tensions. Although the bulk of the Soviet fleet, as argued 
above, may pull back to defend the Eurasian land mass, offensively 
the Soviets may well send small maritime forces out on the high seas 
and some, especially submarines, may enter Canadian waters. Com-
mercial vessels are unlikely to remain in Canadian waters, and am-
phibious attacks (which would require the movement of surface ships 
into Canadian waters) seem well beyond the range of possibilities. 
Non-military Soviet vessels, such as merchant ships and fishing traw-
lers, might attempt to place mines at certain Canadian ports; to combat 
this, Canada should have some minesweeping capability. However, it 
would seem that American ports would be more likely to be the targets 
of such actions. Canadian ships at sea, destined for Canada, could be 
vulnerable to random attacks, although the Soviet's main concern 
would be reinforcement shipping going to Europe. 
In a period of rising tensions, NATO's main concern will be the 
reinforcement of its land/air position in Europe. This will entail the 
commencement of an airlift of U.S. forces to existing prepositioned 
equipment. It will also entail the early commencement of a sealift 
which in turn will require the deployment of allied maritime forces 
to protect the sea lanes. While Canada's ability to secure its own waters 
and those of the CANLANT region in the Western Atlantic will be 
an important initial priority, the Eastern Atlantic SLOC will quickly 
become the focus of allied concerns. The closer the situation moves 
towards hostilities and in the opening phases of a NATO/Warsaw Pact 
war, the greater demand there will be for Canadian maritime forces 
capable of operating in forward areas. This contribution will be par-
ticularly important for the protection of convoys. 
CANADA AND CONVOY ESCORT: A CONTINUING 
COMMITMENT 
It is expected that NATO will employ convoys to move reinforce-
ments and resupply to Europe, especially after the outbreak of hos-
tilities.23 While the growing reach of Soviet naval aviation will pose a 
threat to convoys, submarines will continue to constitute the primary 
danger. A recent report by the North Atlantic Assembly's Subcom-
mittee on Defence Cooperation (ASW), warned that existing stocks 
of equipment in Europe could be drawn down "within as little as 2-
3 days" of the beginning of a conventional war, and therefore, ASW 
operations "would be critical almost from the beginning. Accordingly, 
continued priority must be given to ASW within the Alliance."24 
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The protection of convoys from submarines can take three forms: 
ASW barriers, area search and destroy, and close convoy escort. Bar-
riers will be established at 'choke' points such as the Baltic exits, Gi-
braltar and Dardenelles and along the Giuk gap. Barriers will utilize 
the existing ocean floor Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), surface 
ships, aircraft and submarines. Wide area search and destroy missions 
will be conducted within the gaps in the barrier and other sea areas. 
The combination of barrier and area ASW operations involves large 
ocean areas and a dispersion of forces attempting to reduce the area 
of the search until the submarine is located and can be destroyed. 
Convoy protection, in contrast, necessarily reduces the sea area of 
concern since its immediate goal is to control only that particular sea 
area from which submarines might launch torpedo or missile attacks. 
Close convoy protection also increases the number of ASW forces 
(surface escorts with helicopters, long-range patrol aircraft, carrier-
based aircraft and nuclear attack submarines) directly dedicated to 
shipping protection. This in turn increases the likelihood of identi-
fying and destroying Soviet anti-SLOC forces. 
The advantages of close convoy protection were outlined in a 
1974 U.S. Navy analysis, Accelerated Sealift Study. The study considered 
several force allocations and shipping alternatives, including inde-
pendent sailings of fast merchant ships protected by one or two SSNs 
able to travel at the same speed. It concluded that, in a high-threat 
maritime environment, "in terms of aggregate weapon system effec-
tiveness, area search forces are less effective than convoy screening 
and that merchant ship loss rate using a convoy system is significantly 
lower than the rate using independent transit with indirect support 
from area ASW forces."25 
While long-range aviation and submarines can provide close con-
voy escort, surface forces with their command, control and commu-
nications advantages and concentration of assets, will remain essential 
for this task.26 The Falklands war highlighted the vulnerability of all 
surface combatants. However, the U.S. Navy and other allied navies 
anticipate that new technologies of maritime warfare will increase the 
usefulness and survivability of escort vessels.**** These technologies 
include: cruise missiles for surface-to-surface strikes and strikes against 
land targets, 'towed' array sonars, which allow for long-range detec-
tion of submarines, helicopters and vertical take-off and landing air-
craft that allow for long-range submarine contacts and targeting of 
cruise missiles, and advanced anti-air capability for protection against 
aircraft and missiles. 
The U.S. Navy uses surface combatants in five capacities: (1) as 
escorts for carrier battle groups; (2) as "surface action groups" cen-
tered around modern cruisers; (3) as escorts for amphibious opera-
tions; (4) as escorts for replenishment ships; and (5) as escorts for 
merchant marine shipping. Generally, frigate escorts will remain high 
into the 1990s—at about ninety vessels—while destroyer escorts will 
decline from the present level of over one hundred ten to about forty-
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five.27 Even with increases over current building plans, the U.S. will 
still be looking to its allies to provide much of NATO's convoy escort 
requirements. 
Estimates for the number of surface escorts vary with assumptions 
concerning the number of convoys and attrition rates, as well as with 
the length and scope of the ground/air war. A long war will, of course, 
increase the need for convoys and for escorts. Even a short war, for 
example less than a month, which involves conflict along the entire 
NATO frontier (North, Center and South) will generate a large de-
mand for convoys. One optimistic 'low' estimate for escorts is based 
on the assumption of two convoys per week, seven escorts is based on 
the assumption of two convoys per week, seven escorts per convoy, 
rapid attrition of Soviet submarines, low attrition of escorts and a 
short war. This estimate places the lower bound for surface escorts 
at a minimum of fifty-nine.28 It is likely, though, that the need will 
TABLE B 
NATO ESCORT REQUIREMENTS 
AND ALLIED ESCORT 
CAPABILITIES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
Requirements and Available Forces Number of Ships 
Estimated North Atlantic 
Escorts Required 59-273 
Estimated Allied Escorts Available 
Maximum force available 172 
Less: 
Aviation ship escorts — 18 
Baltic, North Sea, and 
Norwegian coastal escorts — 12 
French, Spanish and Mediterranean 
escorts — 76 
Forces most likely to be available 66 
Less 15 percent overhaul/ 
maintenance allowance —10 
Operational forces available 56 
Range of Estimated Surplus ( + ) or 
Shortfall ( - ) in Available Escorts 
Maximum force available + 1 1 3 / - 1 0 1 
Most likely operational force available - 3 / - 2 1 7 
Source: United States Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Shaping 
The General Purpose Navy of the Eighties: Issues for Fiscal Years 1981-1985 




approach the upper bound, which is based on the assumption of 3,000 
to 6,000 merchant ships each making one transatlantic crossing a 
month. With slightly more than one escort for every twenty-five mer-
chant ships, this estimate calls for just above two hundred seventy 
escort ships.29 
At present, the Alliance can only count upon roughly one hundred 
seventy non-U.S. escort ships with sufficiently modern ASW capabil-
ities, including missiles and helicopters, able to provide convoy pro-
tection. Yet, as Table B indicates, many of these forces will be dedicated 
to other tasks. For example, the German and Danish forces will have 
to watch the Baltic exits and may be required in the North Sea. Nor-
wegian forces will have as an immediate task the operations along the 
far Northern Flank, while the British forces will be deployed along 
the Giuk gap. Projected building and retirement rates for non-U.S. 
surface escorts indicate a less than one-for-one replacement in the 
1980s. Thus, as the U.S. Congressional Budget Office has concluded: 
". . . U.S. defensive forces—already required for protection of U.S. 
carrier task forces, underway replenish groups, amphibious groups 
and perhaps convoys to Asia—could also be required for transatlantic 
convoy escort."30 
The shortfall in surface escorts could further undermine the 
credibility of NATO's sealift posture. Recent predictions foresee ma-
jor losses at sea given existing allied maritime forces. Former SA-
CLANT, Admiral Isaac Kidd, (USN Ret.) predicted that "well over a 
third and probably more of the merchant ships at sea would be de-
stroyed or prevented from delivering their cargoes on the day the 
shooting starts."31 A study by the United States Atlantic Council, under 
the direction of former Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze, estimated 
that even under favourable conditions, that is, a pre-hostilities de-
ployment of allied ASW forces, between three hundred and six 
hundred allied merchant ships would be lost within the first four to 
twelve weeks of a major war at sea. Non-military economic shipping 
could probably not be protected at all.32 
There is no certainty that the U.S. Navy will be able to compensate 
for the lack of allied surface escorts. The opportunity exists, therefore, 
for Canada to make a significant contribution to collective security by 
greatly expanding its surface forces. At present, only the four Tribal 
Class destroyers are capable of meeting NATO requirements. Their 
capability will be improved under the mid-life modernization program 
announced by the Canadian government. The six new City-class patrol 
frigates will be equal in ASW and defensive capabilities to any ships 
in the allied fleet. However, even if the Canadian government goes 
forth with an additional six vessels, it will leave Canada with only 
sixteen modern escort ships for both Atlantic and Pacific duties. With 
the British reducing their surface fleet in favour of aerial and sub-
marine ASW forces,33 and with the modern escort forces of Denmark 
and Germany likely to be dedicated to barrier and convoy roles in 
the North Sea, Canada should seriously consider building at least 
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eighteen of the new City-class frigates. Unlike the surface forces of 
the European allies, Canada's new escorts would be immediately avail-
able to provide for early movements of military shipping from the 
U.S. to Europe. As noted above, this movement ideally will begin in 
advance of hostilities and increase markedly in the event of war. 
Also moving in advance of hostilities would be Canada's Air-Sea 
Transportable group now earmarked for the reinforcement of Nor-
way. Some of this group are now slated for airlift while others, in-
cluding the bulk of equipment, are to travel to five Norwegian ships 
currently pre-allocated for that purpose by the Norwegian govern-
ment. In the absence of hostilities, these ships could move without 
escort, yet during a period of rising tensions, additional frigates would 
allow Canada to provide its own escorts if necessary and still meet 
other allied tasks. However, given the number of troops involved, and 
the necessity of early arrival in Norway, the Canadian government 
would do well to consider airlifting the entire CAST force. This would 
entail prepositioning and additional airlift capacity. 
Building a revitalized MARCOM about eighteen City-class frig-
ates will not be cheap. However, since some of the ships are already 
being built in Canada, this expenditure will have some significant 
beneficial effects on the job market. According to government esti-
mates, the current six-ship project will create 30,000 person-years of 
work across Canada including many in high technology fields.34 
Another element of a NATO-oriented future MARCOM would 
be the doubling of the existing Aurora long-range patrol aircraft 
force. Bringing the total to thirty-six would greatly enhance Canada's 
ability not only to provide further convoy escort, but also to provide 
planes for barrier and search ASW in the Eastern Atlantic and Nor-
wegian sea. In a crisis some of these planes could be forward-based 
in Iceland or Scotland. Doubling the Aurora force will not be cheap 
either, but the potential exists for negotiating further industrial off-
setting agreements. 
The proposal set forth here falls short of the balanced fleet pro-
posed by the Senate Subcommittee. It is, however, one that seems 
more realistic in terms of the costs any Canadian government is likely 
to assume in revitalizing MARCOM. It is also one that has Canada 
building maritime forces with which it can make a much-needed con-
tribution to allied security at sea. The submarine force proposed by 
the Senate Subcommittee would be useful for ASW, but other NATO 
members are already deploying and building major submarine forces. 
Fast patrol boats, armed with surface-to-surface missiles and under-
water weapons are effective for coastal ASW but, here again, the need 
for such small ships will be more pronounced in the European coastal 
waters. Arming Canada's CF-18s with air-to-surface missiles would 
increase their versatility, enabling them to perform a maritime role. 
Nevertheless, NATO's needs for tactical maritime air is better sup-
plied by existing European forces such as the F-16s of the Danish Air 
Force and the German Tornados already committed to the defense 
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of the Baltic exits. Unless Canada were to expand its tactical air ca-
pability, thus making additional forces available to Europe in an emer-
gency, arming the CF-18s (which will barely be able to meet their 
North American and European commitments) does not seem worth-
while. A purchase of some minesweeping capacity could be considered 
because of the danger to Canadian and U.S. harbours posed by Soviet 
forces, although this would not be a high priority. 
CONCLUSION 
NATO is a maritime alliance because its members must have the 
capability to secure and exploit the seas as part of their collective 
deterrent posture. The strategy of flexible response and the growth 
of Soviet maritime capabilities has only heightened the Alliance's need 
to strengthen its maritime forces. In particular, NATO must maintain 
the capability to protect the movement of military equipment destined 
for the ground/air forces. This movement is not only essential for 
conventional resistance but may well be a crucial determinant in al-
lowing the Alliance to avoid first use of nuclear weapons. There is no 
certainty that such a strategy will work. Nonetheless the very uncer-
tainty and ambiguity of the flexible response approach demands that 
NATO prepare to meet an as wide as possible spectrum of threats 
and conflict scenarios, in the hope that such preparations narrow the 
range of Soviet options. Included in these preparations is the main-
tenance of adequate surface escort forces. Even if the United States 
continues to place NATO in the forefront of its global strategic prior-
ities, it will still rely heavily upon its allies to provide surface escorts. 
Yet, projections of the need and availability of such forces indicate a 
serious shortfall in the coming years. 
Canada should respond positively to NATO's need for more sur-
face escorts by building at least eighteen new frigates this will give 
Maritime Command a good deal of the wherewithal with which to 
make a significant military contribution in the event of a NATO/Warsaw 
Pact war. Such a response will be no means inconsistent with Canada's 
overall strategic interests or its own maritime requirements. Canada 
remains committed to collective security through NATO, to the allied 
strategy of flexible response, and to steps that will reduce the Alliance's 
dependence upon nuclear weapons. A substantial increase in Canada's 
surface forces will further all these objectives. An expanded surface 
fleet, coupled with a doubling of long-range patrol aircraft, should 
also provide Canada with more than it needs to militarily secure its 
own waters. Thus even though Canada will have structured its mar-
itime forces primarily to meet alliance obligations, it will still remain 
true that no other aspect of its contributions to collective defense can 
mesh as easily with national requirements as its contributions to the 




NATO Maritime Command Structure 
The following charts, taken from NATO sources, set forth the 
allied maritime command structure. While Atlantic Command and 
Channel Command are the MNCs (major NATO commands) most 
direcdy concerned with maritime strategy, Allied Command Europe 
has several important subordinate commands which deal with mari-
time matters. These include: Commander Allied Forces Baltic Ap-
proaches (under Commander-in-Chief Nor thern Europe), and 
Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (under Com-
mander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe). Also under CIN-
SOUTH is the U.S. Sixtfi Fleet in the Mediterranean. Upon declaration 
of a reinforced alert by NATO, the fleet becomes NATO's Striking 
Force South (STIKFORSOUTH). 
Source: NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation: Facts and Figures (Brussels, NATO, 1981). 
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could be important for surveillance. Aircraft carriers could play a vital role in 
either a nuclear or conventional conflict. Finally, this distinction does not relate 
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element of both NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional maritime forces. 
*** At present CANLANT is under the command of Commander Maritime Com-
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